The Embodied Mind: Perspectives and Limitations


  • Vlad Glăveanu


Radboud University Nijmegen October 27, 2010 – October 28, 2010 The last decade cognitive neuroscience has seen a growing interest in an embodied view of cognition, according to which higher-level cognition is supported by basic sensory-motor structures. However, the embodied view of cognition has not gone unchallenged and has been criticized on both methodological and philosophical grounds. In addition, researchers from within the field differ in their views, ranging from strong claims about embodied processes as a necessary prerequisite for thinking to weaker claims about embodiment as merely accompanying higher-order cognitive processes. Crucial questions that remain unanswered include: “How conclusive is the support for strong or weak claims of embodied cognition?”, “How does an embodied view of cognition account for higher-order abstract thinking?” and “How do we represent concepts that we have never experienced ourselves?”. This workshop aims to shed light on these issues by getting together empirical researchers of embodied cognition from different backgrounds.