Naïve Theories of Emotions: Why People Might (Not) Be Uncertain or in Conflict About Felt Emotions

Abstract

Beliefs about conflict and uncertainty over felt emotions—for Joy, Pride, Sadness, Jealousy and Envy events—were studied by means of Yes/No and Why questions. Each participant (N = 1,156) judged a typical antecedent for a single emotion—e.g., Jealousy: story protagonist SP sees his or her partner kiss someone. The Yes/No results showed that SP was frequently expected to experience both phenomena, the more so the greater the event impact (Yes range: 40–86%). Beliefs associated with Yes answers (BY) were categorized into 4 categories: (BY1) reason-emotion opposition—felt emotions are unreasonable, inadequate ways of reacting; (BY2) ambivalent emotions—e.g., joy and sadness; (BY3) unclear emotions; (BY4) other causes—e.g., focused on event implications, SP’s personality. No conflict or uncertainty answers (BN; range 14–60%) mirrored BY categories: (BN1) no reason-emotion opposition, (BN2) no ambivalent emotions, (BN3) clear emotions, (BN4) other causes. Attributions and beliefs about causes did not generally differ by gender. As a collective entity, expressed beliefs were complex, focusing on one or more emotion component—e.g., appraisal, regulation, expression—as well as on emotion intensity, duration, and on self-concept issues. Overall, expressed beliefs seemed to imply a malleability theory of emotions, and emotion awareness. Results overall confirmed the hypotheses that conflict and uncertainty attributions are more likely for: unpleasant experiences; when emotions are norm-incongruent for the judged event; when mixed, ambivalent emotions are felt. The study confirms that people interpret emotion processes according to their lay theories.